Reviewed by John Cottingham, University of Reading Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Wielenberg's book is a conditional apologia for naturalism. It is conditional in so far as he explicitly states that he will not argue for the truth of naturalism, but rather, on the assumption that it is true, will endeavour to acquit it of the damaging implications it is often taken to have.
A common charge is that without God human life is meaningless. Wielenberg, to his credit, rejects a number of over-easy rebuttals to this charge -- for example that if there were no God, mere preference for certain activities would be enough to endow them with meaning. This won't do, argues Wielenberg, because the excrement eater, even if endowed with a strong desire to pursue his chosen activity, does not qualify as having a meaningful life. What one might call an 'internalist' account of meaningfulness cannot rely merely on the brute fact that we like to do certain things. What is needed, in addition, is that our activities have some kind of intrinsic value: "Even if there is no supernatural commander to assign purposes to our lives or a suitably Significant Deity to care about our lives, the existence of intrinsically good activities would make it possible for us to bring internal meaning to our lives." (p. 34).
...Even those, however, who are out of sympathy with Wielenberg's approach, and his worldview, will find much that is worthwhile in this book. It is written with verve and clarity, and is for the most part highly accessible, yet densely packed with thoughtful and often provocative ideas and arguments. It bears the hallmark of having been forged in the lecture-room through vigorous debate, and it should provoke equally vigorous discussion among students and others. Altogether, it is a useful addition to the new and exciting wave of philosophical writing that is turning the skills of analytic philosophy back upon ancient and central questions about the meaning of human existence.
Wielenberg's book is a conditional apologia for naturalism. It is conditional in so far as he explicitly states that he will not argue for the truth of naturalism, but rather, on the assumption that it is true, will endeavour to acquit it of the damaging implications it is often taken to have.
A common charge is that without God human life is meaningless. Wielenberg, to his credit, rejects a number of over-easy rebuttals to this charge -- for example that if there were no God, mere preference for certain activities would be enough to endow them with meaning. This won't do, argues Wielenberg, because the excrement eater, even if endowed with a strong desire to pursue his chosen activity, does not qualify as having a meaningful life. What one might call an 'internalist' account of meaningfulness cannot rely merely on the brute fact that we like to do certain things. What is needed, in addition, is that our activities have some kind of intrinsic value: "Even if there is no supernatural commander to assign purposes to our lives or a suitably Significant Deity to care about our lives, the existence of intrinsically good activities would make it possible for us to bring internal meaning to our lives." (p. 34).
...Even those, however, who are out of sympathy with Wielenberg's approach, and his worldview, will find much that is worthwhile in this book. It is written with verve and clarity, and is for the most part highly accessible, yet densely packed with thoughtful and often provocative ideas and arguments. It bears the hallmark of having been forged in the lecture-room through vigorous debate, and it should provoke equally vigorous discussion among students and others. Altogether, it is a useful addition to the new and exciting wave of philosophical writing that is turning the skills of analytic philosophy back upon ancient and central questions about the meaning of human existence.
