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JtA: I didn't understand why the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA in the City of Boerne decision.

Well the short answer is, the SCOTUS found that Congress overreached from its authority in passing RFRA. Specifically, the majority Opinion found:

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RFRA is not a proper exercise of Congress' 5 enforcement power because it contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal-state balance.

All told, RFRA is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogative and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens, and is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion.

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Why RFRA was found to be unconstitutional is a longer answer involving a bit of history on other cases that Haiman mentions. In 1990, SCOTUS ruled on Employment Division v. Smith, denying relief to Respondents who sued for unemployment compensation. Respondents were fired for ingesting peyote, and were denied unemployment compensation under Oregon law that disqualifies employees discharged for work-related "misconduct." The constitutional question before SCOTUS was whether the free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects Respondents' religiously motivated use of peyote from the reach of Oregon's general application of criminal law. Judicial precedent applied what is generally known as the Sherbert test which requires that any "governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest." The majority held that Sherbert did not apply to a generally applicable law that had no intent to inhibit free religious expression, and on the contrary merely served the intent of regulating the state against the use and abuse of a controlled substance.

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Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now.

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And again

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To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling" -- permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. at 167 -- contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.

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In this same case, O'Connor wrote a compelling concurring Opinion where she agreed with the majority's final ruling but dissented from their process. She thought the Sherbert test applied and that the State's compelling interest had been met, arguing that judicial precedent requires "the Government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.":

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The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests.

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Essentially, O'Connor, and Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun who in dissenting joined in this portion of O'Connor's Opinion, found that though the infringement of Respondents' religious practice was merely an indirect affect of a generally applied law, the state still had to provide compelling interest to justify the restriction of free religious expression. The majority found otherwise and the Respondents lost their case.

In response to this finding there was an unprecedented outcry among civil rights and religious groups, and the likes of the ACLU and the Traditional Values Coalition joined hands and pushed through RFRA, which overwhelmingly passed in the House and Senate--if memory serves, one was unanimous. The stated purpose of RFRA was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner"; and "to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." The onus then was placed on the government, demanding that the government must demonstrate any burden on a person's free religious expression:

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(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest;
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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

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Boerne was the first time SCOTUS addressed RFRA. A Catholic Archbishop applied for a building permit to enlarge a church. The city denied the permit because of a "historic preservation" zoning governing the area, including the church. The Archbishop sued for relief citing RFRA. In its Opinion SCOTUS found that Congress, in enacting RFRA as a direct response to the finding in Employment Division v. Smith, had exceeded their power as granted in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That though Congress has the power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, their power did not extend to interpreting the Constitution, which is solely under the purview of the judiciary. Because RFRA was enacted in response to, and to address, a decision already made by SCOTUS; and because RFRA places such a "heavy litigation burden on the States and terms of curtailing their traditional regulatory power," the majority found that "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."

This is a very short, not exhaustively inclusive, summary of three major cases--Sherbert, Smith and Boerne. There is an array of concurring and dissenting Opinions creating a vast expanse of gray that I hardly touched upon. It is interesting reading, but to try to describe it all here would be pretty much impossible.

(On a side note George. After spending about fifteen hours reading through caselaw, and really only just scratching the surface of all that RFRA involves, I am more certain than ever that Dawkins had absolutely no idea what he was talking about when he referenced Gonzales v. O Centro... in The God Delusion and should have just stayed away from it.)

JtA: Perhaps Scalia has a different viewpoint of Christian practice than he does of less common religions.

Yeahthat was kind of the point of my post, though I don't blame you for not getting it, I never really spelled it out. My mind has been off in Neverland recently, I swear. The first paragraph was meant to spell out where Scalia valued religion to the point that he thought it should interfere with a high school graduation-requiring student nonbelievers to either shut-up or disappear, but doesn't think any consideration should be given to American Indian religious rituals. I think this may be a case of Scalia valuing his own set of beliefs (allowances for Christian prayer) over a general approach to jurisprudence (legal consideration for all religious sects). As I said, I could be reading the cases and his decisions wrong, but that was supposed to be the thrust of my original post.

The references to the business aspect was a side thought that popped up as I was typing up the rest, but then ended up being the focus and conclusion of the post. Maybe I've been taking too much peyote. Sorry for the confusion.