In the poll thread "What do you believe about science?", several people questioned the validity of the some of the options I presented because the focussed in part on our reactions to the findings of science. I want to raise some questions in this thread, but for anyone still looking for some answer as to why I provided the options that I did, here are the basics.
One of the most frequent responses in that thread was that science was first and foremost a method of inquiry. I took that to mean that the findings of science at any given time were entirely secondary to that method, a status confirmed in part by the insistence on the relative impermanence of scientific "truth".
I've read a great deal of the literature of science as a method, but I'm not sure I agree that the value of that method outstrips the impact of scientific findings. And more to the point, I think it unlikely that most of us really value the method more than the findings. I wouldn't want to psychoanalysize anyone's answers too closely, but it seems to me that the party-line about science's value as a method is a justification for science in response to very specialized critiques, and that it has, through certain popular writers, drifted into popular consciousness.
First things first, though, let's talk about this idea that science is first and foremost a method. Several writers on science (all of them reknowned and practicing scientists themselves) have shed some light on other facets of science; their writings have been very influential in the way that I view science, and I think that the aspects they discuss are as central to the way that we use and assimilate science as anything within the "science as method" hypothesis. In particular, I want to bring two of those writers to everyone's attention.
The first is Jacob Bronowski, whose book "Science and Human Values" was something of a landmark in the project to reconcile science with the humanities. In it, he discusses science as a community, and if we think about the way in which science works, I think we can see how that both differs from and reinforces the notion of science as a method. If science were only a method, then you or I could practice it independently of one another and not worry about whether or not our findings coincided. Whatever I came up would be of value to me, and to hell with you (and vice-versa). But, in fact, part of what we're talking about when we talk about science is a community of scientists who build off of one another's work. And the way that community takes shape and intercommunicates determines, in part, the way that science is done. The much-lauded "self-correcting mechanisms" of science are, in fact, almost entirely a function of science as a community. Who gets included in that community also has an impact, and it's of no little consequence that the direction of scientific research is guided in part by the fiscal interests of major corporations.
All of those factors play into the communal nature of science as we know it, but the thing I want to emphasize most in Bronowski's thesis is the fact that we value science a great deal for the ways in which it allows us to structure our society. And that's something we do not in reference to science as a method -- which is, after all, something most of us give very little thought to over the course of a lifetime -- but in reference to its findings. When we hear that there may be a genetic disposition in males towards certain forms of violence, we may be inclined to shift our political and social positions in subtle or overt ways. Knowing that those findings were based on sound scientific method may make us more confident about the validity of those findings; conversely, knowing that science is constantly revising its conclusions may make us prone to take it with a grain of salt. But I think it's a bit naive to suppose that, in the moment of shifting our position, the method of science is as personally significant as the findings it produces.
The second author I wanted to present is John Ziman, whose book "Reliable Knowledge" is one of the most comprehensive and fluff-free descriptions of actual scientific work that I've ever encountered. One of the ideas he forwards in that book is that the productive aim of normal scientific practice is to contribute to a "cognitive map" of the world. That is to say, that, when taken together, all of the findings supported by science at any one time present a picture of reality as we know it. That's of no little consequence. On the micro level, each one of us assembles whatever tidbits of information we've gleaned from popular science outlets into our own little cognitive map of the world, and we make reference to that map whenever we try to "navigate" one problem or another. So our understanding of evolution may end up informing our decisions in regard to how best to prepare our children for independent life; our understanding of the inner workings of nuclear physics may influence our decision to vote for one candidate or another; our understanding of nutrition influences our decision of where to eat lunch.
To the end that modern science is also serves as a community, and provides the rudiments of a cognitive map, the emphasis on science as a method seems, to me, highly misleading. It distorts the picture of what effect science actually has on people by minimizing our awareness of science as anything but a way of determining which of several competing claims is the most viable. To the person who says that science is not about truth, I might agree on sheer epistemic and terminological grounds; but the crucial point, so far as I can see, is that we often behave as though a scientific finding were true. If science were primarily a method, then science would only be important to itself; by the same token, if knitting is also a method, but its importance to most people is that which it provides, ie. clothing.
One of the most frequent responses in that thread was that science was first and foremost a method of inquiry. I took that to mean that the findings of science at any given time were entirely secondary to that method, a status confirmed in part by the insistence on the relative impermanence of scientific "truth".
I've read a great deal of the literature of science as a method, but I'm not sure I agree that the value of that method outstrips the impact of scientific findings. And more to the point, I think it unlikely that most of us really value the method more than the findings. I wouldn't want to psychoanalysize anyone's answers too closely, but it seems to me that the party-line about science's value as a method is a justification for science in response to very specialized critiques, and that it has, through certain popular writers, drifted into popular consciousness.
First things first, though, let's talk about this idea that science is first and foremost a method. Several writers on science (all of them reknowned and practicing scientists themselves) have shed some light on other facets of science; their writings have been very influential in the way that I view science, and I think that the aspects they discuss are as central to the way that we use and assimilate science as anything within the "science as method" hypothesis. In particular, I want to bring two of those writers to everyone's attention.
The first is Jacob Bronowski, whose book "Science and Human Values" was something of a landmark in the project to reconcile science with the humanities. In it, he discusses science as a community, and if we think about the way in which science works, I think we can see how that both differs from and reinforces the notion of science as a method. If science were only a method, then you or I could practice it independently of one another and not worry about whether or not our findings coincided. Whatever I came up would be of value to me, and to hell with you (and vice-versa). But, in fact, part of what we're talking about when we talk about science is a community of scientists who build off of one another's work. And the way that community takes shape and intercommunicates determines, in part, the way that science is done. The much-lauded "self-correcting mechanisms" of science are, in fact, almost entirely a function of science as a community. Who gets included in that community also has an impact, and it's of no little consequence that the direction of scientific research is guided in part by the fiscal interests of major corporations.
All of those factors play into the communal nature of science as we know it, but the thing I want to emphasize most in Bronowski's thesis is the fact that we value science a great deal for the ways in which it allows us to structure our society. And that's something we do not in reference to science as a method -- which is, after all, something most of us give very little thought to over the course of a lifetime -- but in reference to its findings. When we hear that there may be a genetic disposition in males towards certain forms of violence, we may be inclined to shift our political and social positions in subtle or overt ways. Knowing that those findings were based on sound scientific method may make us more confident about the validity of those findings; conversely, knowing that science is constantly revising its conclusions may make us prone to take it with a grain of salt. But I think it's a bit naive to suppose that, in the moment of shifting our position, the method of science is as personally significant as the findings it produces.
The second author I wanted to present is John Ziman, whose book "Reliable Knowledge" is one of the most comprehensive and fluff-free descriptions of actual scientific work that I've ever encountered. One of the ideas he forwards in that book is that the productive aim of normal scientific practice is to contribute to a "cognitive map" of the world. That is to say, that, when taken together, all of the findings supported by science at any one time present a picture of reality as we know it. That's of no little consequence. On the micro level, each one of us assembles whatever tidbits of information we've gleaned from popular science outlets into our own little cognitive map of the world, and we make reference to that map whenever we try to "navigate" one problem or another. So our understanding of evolution may end up informing our decisions in regard to how best to prepare our children for independent life; our understanding of the inner workings of nuclear physics may influence our decision to vote for one candidate or another; our understanding of nutrition influences our decision of where to eat lunch.
To the end that modern science is also serves as a community, and provides the rudiments of a cognitive map, the emphasis on science as a method seems, to me, highly misleading. It distorts the picture of what effect science actually has on people by minimizing our awareness of science as anything but a way of determining which of several competing claims is the most viable. To the person who says that science is not about truth, I might agree on sheer epistemic and terminological grounds; but the crucial point, so far as I can see, is that we often behave as though a scientific finding were true. If science were primarily a method, then science would only be important to itself; by the same token, if knitting is also a method, but its importance to most people is that which it provides, ie. clothing.
